TenantAssignment and readside filtering

src/lib/db.ts

@@ -82,6 +82,39 @@ const MIGRATION_SQL = `
     content    TEXT NOT NULL,
     updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
   );
+
+  -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  -- Slice 6: per-tenant user assignments
+  -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  --
+  -- Each row grants ONE user visibility into ONE tenant within their own
+  -- ZITADEL org. Used to narrow the customer 'user' role from "everything
+  -- in the org" to "only the tenants I've been assigned to". Owners and
+  -- platform users bypass this table entirely.
+  --
+  -- Composite PK is (tenant_name, zitadel_user_id) — a user is either
+  -- assigned to a tenant or not, no degree.
+  --
+  -- The zitadel_org_id column is denormalised onto every row so cascade
+  -- cleanups when a user leaves an org can be expressed as a single
+  -- DELETE WHERE zitadel_org_id=$1 AND zitadel_user_id=$2 — without
+  -- joining tenant_requests. The assigned_by column tracks which user
+  -- (the owner usually) granted the assignment, for audit.
+  --
+  -- Cascade on tenant deletion is enforced in application code (the
+  -- admin delete handler calls removeAllAssignmentsForTenant) rather
+  -- than via FK — there's no FK target, since K8s CRs aren't a Postgres
+  -- table.
+  CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tenant_user_assignments (
+    tenant_name      TEXT NOT NULL,
+    zitadel_org_id   TEXT NOT NULL,
+    zitadel_user_id  TEXT NOT NULL,
+    assigned_at      TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+    assigned_by      TEXT NOT NULL,
+    PRIMARY KEY (tenant_name, zitadel_user_id)
+  );
+  CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_tua_user ON tenant_user_assignments(zitadel_user_id);
+  CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_tua_org  ON tenant_user_assignments(zitadel_org_id);
 `;
 
 let migrated = false;
@@ -417,3 +450,150 @@ function mapRow(row: any): TenantRequest {
     updatedAt: row.updated_at?.toISOString?.() ?? row.updated_at,
   };
 }
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Slice 6: tenant ↔ user assignments
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * One assignment grants one user visibility into one tenant. Returned
+ * shape is the camelCase mirror of the Postgres row.
+ */
+export interface TenantUserAssignment {
+  tenantName: string;
+  zitadelOrgId: string;
+  zitadelUserId: string;
+  assignedAt: string;
+  assignedBy: string;
+}
+
+function mapAssignmentRow(row: any): TenantUserAssignment {
+  return {
+    tenantName: row.tenant_name,
+    zitadelOrgId: row.zitadel_org_id,
+    zitadelUserId: row.zitadel_user_id,
+    assignedAt: row.assigned_at?.toISOString?.() ?? row.assigned_at,
+    assignedBy: row.assigned_by,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns the set of tenant CR names assigned to the given user.
+ *
+ * Hot path on every read for `user`-role customers, so it's intentionally
+ * a single indexed lookup. The returned array is small (a handful of
+ * tenants per user); callers usually wrap it in a Set.
+ *
+ * Note: this does NOT cross-check the org id — assignments are per-user,
+ * and a user's org context comes from their JWT. If a user's
+ * authorization is revoked at the ZITADEL level, their JWT ceases to
+ * carry the customer role and they can't reach the dashboard at all;
+ * the orphan rows are cleaned up the next time their org membership
+ * is re-evaluated (Slice 7's removeAllAssignmentsForUser).
+ */
+export async function listTenantAssignmentsForUser(
+  userId: string
+): Promise<string[]> {
+  await ensureSchema();
+  const result = await getPool().query<{ tenant_name: string }>(
+    "SELECT tenant_name FROM tenant_user_assignments WHERE zitadel_user_id = $1",
+    [userId]
+  );
+  return result.rows.map((r) => r.tenant_name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns all assignments for a single tenant. Used by the team UI
+ * (Slice 7) to render "who has access to this instance". Includes
+ * `assignedBy` and `assignedAt` for audit display.
+ */
+export async function listAssignmentsForTenant(
+  tenantName: string
+): Promise<TenantUserAssignment[]> {
+  await ensureSchema();
+  const result = await getPool().query(
+    "SELECT * FROM tenant_user_assignments WHERE tenant_name = $1 ORDER BY assigned_at DESC",
+    [tenantName]
+  );
+  return result.rows.map(mapAssignmentRow);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Grant a user access to a tenant. Idempotent — a duplicate INSERT
+ * is silently ignored via ON CONFLICT, and the existing
+ * `assigned_at`/`assigned_by` are preserved (we don't update them on
+ * re-assign).
+ *
+ * Caller is responsible for verifying:
+ *   - The actor (`assignedBy`) holds owner/platform role in `orgId`.
+ *   - The target user (`userId`) is actually a member of the same
+ *     ZITADEL org. We don't validate this here — the team UI fetches
+ *     the org's user list from ZITADEL and selects from it.
+ *   - The tenant CR exists and is labelled with the same `orgId`.
+ */
+export async function addTenantAssignment(params: {
+  tenantName: string;
+  orgId: string;
+  userId: string;
+  assignedBy: string;
+}): Promise<void> {
+  await ensureSchema();
+  await getPool().query(
+    `INSERT INTO tenant_user_assignments
+       (tenant_name, zitadel_org_id, zitadel_user_id, assigned_by)
+     VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4)
+     ON CONFLICT (tenant_name, zitadel_user_id) DO NOTHING`,
+    [params.tenantName, params.orgId, params.userId, params.assignedBy]
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Revoke a user's access to a tenant. No-op if the row doesn't exist.
+ */
+export async function removeTenantAssignment(
+  tenantName: string,
+  userId: string
+): Promise<void> {
+  await ensureSchema();
+  await getPool().query(
+    "DELETE FROM tenant_user_assignments WHERE tenant_name = $1 AND zitadel_user_id = $2",
+    [tenantName, userId]
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Cascade cleanup: drop ALL assignments for a tenant when the tenant
+ * itself is deleted. Called from the admin delete handler.
+ *
+ * Without this, an orphan row would stick around forever — a future
+ * tenant with the same name (won't happen given Slice 1's UUID-suffix
+ * naming, but defense in depth) would inherit the old assignments.
+ */
+export async function removeAllAssignmentsForTenant(
+  tenantName: string
+): Promise<void> {
+  await ensureSchema();
+  await getPool().query(
+    "DELETE FROM tenant_user_assignments WHERE tenant_name = $1",
+    [tenantName]
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Cascade cleanup: drop ALL assignments for a user within a specific
+ * org. Used by Slice 7's "remove member" flow when an owner kicks a
+ * user out of the org. Scoped by `orgId` so a user with assignments in
+ * org A doesn't lose them when removed from org B (multi-org users
+ * exist when a person registers personally and is also invited to a
+ * company).
+ */
+export async function removeAllAssignmentsForUser(
+  orgId: string,
+  userId: string
+): Promise<void> {
+  await ensureSchema();
+  await getPool().query(
+    "DELETE FROM tenant_user_assignments WHERE zitadel_org_id = $1 AND zitadel_user_id = $2",
+    [orgId, userId]
+  );
+}

src/lib/visibility.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+/**
+ * Tenant visibility scoping for the customer-facing portal.
+ *
+ * Centralised here so every endpoint that lists or fetches tenants
+ * agrees on the same rules. A bug in any one of those — say, a stale
+ * inline filter that returned org-wide results to a `user`-role member
+ * — would leak siblings' workspace files and channel-user lists.
+ * One source of truth makes the audit easy.
+ *
+ * Visibility model
+ * ----------------
+ *   platform_admin / platform_operator → all tenants in the cluster.
+ *   owner (customer)                   → all tenants in their own org.
+ *   user (customer, no owner role)     → only tenants they've been
+ *                                        assigned to via the
+ *                                        tenant_user_assignments table.
+ *
+ * The narrowing for `user` is what turns the customer role into a
+ * meaningful access boundary. Without it, every member of an org
+ * would see every tenant — fine for a one-team SaaS, broken for a
+ * company with separate Production / Staging / Sales instances where
+ * the Sales team shouldn't see the Production workspace files.
+ *
+ * Owners do NOT get filtered against the assignment table even if
+ * they happen to have rows in it. The owner role beats user-level
+ * scoping — that's the point of being an owner.
+ */
+
+import type { SessionUser, PiecedTenant } from "@/types";
+import { listTenantAssignmentsForUser } from "./db";
+
+/** Internal classifier — "what's this caller's visibility scope?". */
+type Scope = "all" | "org" | "assigned";
+
+function scopeFor(user: SessionUser): Scope {
+  if (user.isPlatform) return "all";
+  if (user.roles.includes("owner")) return "org";
+  return "assigned";
+}
+
+/**
+ * Filter a list of tenants down to what `user` is allowed to see.
+ *
+ * Performs at most one DB query (only when scope is "assigned") and
+ * runs the K8s-side filter in memory. The K8s list is already small
+ * (≤100 tenants at pilot scale) so this is fine; if it grew we'd
+ * push the filter down to the K8s label selector instead.
+ */
+export async function listVisibleTenants(
+  user: SessionUser,
+  all: PiecedTenant[]
+): Promise<PiecedTenant[]> {
+  const scope = scopeFor(user);
+
+  if (scope === "all") return all;
+
+  const orgScoped = all.filter(
+    (t) => t.metadata.labels?.["pieced.ch/zitadel-org-id"] === user.orgId
+  );
+
+  if (scope === "org") return orgScoped;
+
+  // scope === "assigned" — narrow to the user's assignment list
+  const assigned = await listTenantAssignmentsForUser(user.id);
+  if (assigned.length === 0) return [];
+
+  const allowed = new Set(assigned);
+  return orgScoped.filter((t) => allowed.has(t.metadata.name));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Single-tenant predicate. Returns true when `user` may see (and read
+ * from) `tenant`. Mutating endpoints additionally need
+ * `canMutate(user)` from `lib/session.ts` — visibility ≠ permission to
+ * change.
+ *
+ * Returns false (rather than throwing) so handlers can map to the
+ * status code that fits their semantics — usually 404 for read paths
+ * (don't leak existence) and 403 for mutation paths (caller already
+ * knew the tenant existed).
+ */
+export async function canUserSeeTenant(
+  user: SessionUser,
+  tenant: PiecedTenant
+): Promise<boolean> {
+  const scope = scopeFor(user);
+
+  if (scope === "all") return true;
+
+  // org scope and assigned scope both require the tenant to belong
+  // to the user's org — different orgs are never visible.
+  if (tenant.metadata.labels?.["pieced.ch/zitadel-org-id"] !== user.orgId) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (scope === "org") return true;
+
+  // scope === "assigned"
+  const assigned = await listTenantAssignmentsForUser(user.id);
+  return assigned.includes(tenant.metadata.name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * "Should `user` see in-flight tenant requests on the dashboard?"
+ *
+ * Owners and platform users yes (they own the lifecycle); user-role
+ * members no (they can't act on requests, and a request that isn't
+ * yet a tenant has no assignment yet, so showing it would be a
+ * permanent "pending" with no action they can take).
+ */
+export function canSeeInflightRequests(user: SessionUser): boolean {
+  return scopeFor(user) !== "assigned";
+}
+
+/**
+ * Convenience predicate used by client-side empty states. For
+ * `user`-role members, the dashboard wants to distinguish between
+ * "your org has no instances" (very rare; ask owner to set one up)
+ * and "your org has instances but you're not assigned to any" (more
+ * common; ask owner to grant access).
+ *
+ * Callers compute this off the difference between visible and
+ * org-wide tenant lists; this helper just reifies the test.
+ */
+export function isUserScoped(user: SessionUser): boolean {
+  return scopeFor(user) === "assigned";
+}